Thursday, March 31, 2016

The “bad bank” that escusava having just “so bad” – publico

                 


                         
                     


                         

                 

 
 

Antonio Varela, Banif former administrator representing the State (to September 2014), strange incident that occurred in the days before the resolution of the bank and when it was administrator of the Bank of Portugal (September 2014 to March 2015): while devoting the central bank to prepare “a plan that would allow to create a bridge bank”, similar to the New Bank (which holds the assets “good” BES), a task that was developing in liaison with the ECB, the ECB itself was the Bank of Portugal, “upstairs to deal with the resolution of Banif”.

Varela also shows that 18 December was in São Bento with António Costa and Mario Centeno to analyze the free sale process that was being conducted by the management of Banif, led by George Thomas . at the meeting, which took place at 21.30, had the opportunity to express to the Government that the option should be the sale of Banif, only then would the way of resolution. And he expressed then “hope” in the success of a sale. In response to the deputy CDS, John Adams, the former director of the Bank of Portugal claims that the government tried to gain time to advance from the sale of Banif, but their belief is that neither the ECB nor the DG Comp wanted this solution and forced the resolution before the entry in 2016, because too seriously the holidays of Easter.

“There was nothing to do” and the result was “disastrous” for the Portuguese taxpayers. And “not met the interests of depositors and Portuguese taxpayers.” Varela maintains that the bridge bank would have been more favorable to the interests of taxpayers.

However, Varela does not hesitate to qualify the bank he found when he arrived after the public intervention. Banif “private” in 2012, “was a bank very, very bad, it was a bad bank.” I had a “wrong strategy” which depended on “completely disparate investments,” a “lending policy with very high exposure to real estate.” And more: “There was no computer system, had no risk assessment”

In summary:. “It was difficult because we did not went wrong What escusava was that had gone so badly..” However Varela considers that the State had their hands tied when it injected public capital (the previous government) and when he was grappling with the resolution (current government).

The greatest responsibility attributed to the European institutions – DG Comp, European Commission and ECB. They are, in his words, “institutions that are far from democratic scrutiny.” And Banif, as most Portuguese banks, represent very little “. We are talking about peanuts to these entities”

In Brussels and Frankfurt, ensure there is a “thought almost cynical,” according to which “the Portuguese that there have problems, they were that arranged them that resolve.”

Especially when Christmas approaches, as was the case with Banif, whose resolution was decided on 20 last December. “The European institutions want to extend the Christmas holidays.” And strengthened the note. “It’s feeling revolt by such situations I decided to give this note.”

The Christmas holidays

Under deputy interrogation of PCP, Miguel James Varela considered that the outcome found for Banif was framed in the fact that European officials wanting to go on “vacation extended at Christmas”, so neither the Bank of Portugal or the Government had way to counter a closing decision of the dossier quickly, “it is one of the banking union costs.”

And he said that this Brussels intention to terminate the Banif process before the end of 2015 was only known for the first time the Bank of Portugal on 17 November by letter of DG Comp.

the PCP’s deputy questioned the assumptions of public recapitalization plan Banif, in 1100 million, and the ability of the State to recover that investment. Antonio Varela explained that, as time passed, the repayment terms have become increasingly difficult.

After fixing one of the deputies who assigned the former deputy governor of function of the central bank, explained that “despite having been invited to be deputy governor, this never materialized,” noting that the third version of the Banif restructuring plan, sent in January 2014 to DG Comp, resulted in a request for clarification to the bank because the data were “all wrong.”

                     
 
 
                 


                     

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